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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the relationship between corporate socially responsible (CSR) activities and tax avoidance using 
residual book-tax differences (BTD), year residual BTD and total BTD. Using a sample of 1,148 publicly listed Korean 
firms on Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) covering periods between 2004 and 2009 it finds that the firms with higher 
CSR activities are less likely to avoid taxes regardless which proxy of tax avoidance is used. This finding is confirmed 
with two stage least square (2SLS) method after accounting for endogeneity of CSR. It also tests how seven different 
CSR activities affect tax avoidance, and finds that social services, satisfaction of employees and contributions to 
economic development are negatively related to tax avoidance. Overall, the empirical results of this paper support 
the previous studies arguing the negative relationship between tax avoidance and CSR. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
ince Scholes and Wolfson (1992) first show that managers have incentives to pursue tax strategy in a way 
that it minimizes corporate taxes in order to maximize firm’s profit the number of studies have been done 
on tax strategy. As Zimmerman (1983) argues, however, minimizing taxes may not be always the most 
efficient tax strategy because it may occur additional costs (i.e. government regulations and auditing by non-
government organization (NGO)). Thus, it is important to take into account specific corporate environments such as 
financing choices, corporate governance, tax-related laws, government policy, compensation policy, risk management 
decisions, and corporate social responsibility (here after, CSR) to see how taxes influence corporate financial decision-
making (See Hanlon & Heitzman (2010)). Even though the extensive research offers empirical evidence on such 
relationship between tax strategy and corporate environments, to knowledge there are few studies which examine how 
CSR affects managers’ decision-making on taxes. 
 
The objective of this study is to investigate how tax avoidance as one of tax strategies affects firms’ CSR activities. 
In 2010 International Organization for Standardization (ISO) adopted ISO 26000 on Guidance for social 
responsibility. It implies that the stakeholders become increasingly aware of the need for and benefits of firms’ social 
responsibilities, and accordingly they become one of crucial factors managers would consider for decision-making 
and management strategy. 
 
Freedman (2003) argues that tax aggressiveness of firms with high CSR activities tends to occur additional costs due 
to high expectation and understanding of stakeholders on social responsibilities. Thus, it is expected for managers not 
to avoid taxes in order to reduce potential risks and induce disclosure effects of financial reporting. Watson (2011) 
also shows that firms with low CSR activities are more likely to be tax-aggressive because stakeholders of such firms 
are not surprised by socially irresponsible activities. 
 
This study confirms the main findings of these two studies; the higher the level CSR of a corporation, the lower the 
level of tax avoidance. However, this study is different from Freedman (2003) and Watson (2011) in several points. 
First, Freedman (2003) offers only conceptual analysis the relationship, but does not provide empirical evidence. Even 
though Watson (2011) empirically tests the relationship between CSR values and tax avoidance, his empirical studies 
are limited to firms with low CSR activities. Second, this study employs different measurement of tax avoidance from 
one used by Watson (2011). While Watson introduces the unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs) as a proxy for tax 
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aggressiveness, this study uses three different proxies to measure tax avoidance: residual book-tax differences (here 
after, BTD), year residual BTD and total BTD. 
 
This study uses Korean Economic Justice Institute (KEJI) Index database. It provides social responsibility scores of 
publicly listed Korean firms on Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) in seven major categories: financial prudence, fairness 
and transparency, social services, consumer protection, protection of environments, satisfaction of employees, 
contributions to economic development for each firm-year. The sample contains 1,148 firm-year observations 
covering periods between 2004 and 2009.  
 
This study finds that the negative relationship between the firm’s CSR values and tax avoidance holds regardless 
which proxy of tax avoidance is used: The firms with higher CSR activities are less likely to avoid taxes. This finding 
is confirmed with two stage least square (2SLS) method after accounting for endogeneity of CSR. This paper also 
tests how seven different CSR activities affect tax avoidance. It finds that social services, satisfaction of employees 
and contributions to economic development are negatively related to tax avoidance. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides previous literature. Section 3 develops the 
hypothesis of this paper. Section 4 describes the data and research design. Empirical results are reported and analyzed 
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. THE PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 
Zimmerman (1983) tests whether the firm’s political costs as a proxy for firm size are associated with corporate tax 
rates. His study finds the positive relationship between them. He argues that larger size of firms tends to bear higher 
political costs and the corporate tax rates are one of a firm’s political costs, and thus as the firm size gets larger the 
corporate tax rates becomes higher and the tax benefits would be smaller.  
 
The study by Mills and Sansing (2000) is to examine how BTD affect the probability of auditing transaction and 
collecting additional taxes. Using Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data from the Coordinated Examination Program 
they find that the probability of auditing transaction by government increases as the a positive BTD exists due to the 
possibility of tax avoidance. 
 
Plesko (2004) argues that the book-tax income spread provides tax authorities the information on adaptation to tax 
payment and investors better understanding on the quality of the book-tax spread. It, thus, implies that tax authorities 
and investors can make effective decision-making through the book-tax income spread and especially obtain the 
information on tax avoidance.   
 
3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
For CSR behaviors to attract investors they should be able to reach not only maximization of economical values but 
also realization of proper social and ethical values. In order to achieve these two purposes CSR behaviors will be 
invested based on both financial and ethical criteria. CSR behaviors are one type of investment, not charity, but it 
would not be done by only financial purposes. It may be selected due to ethical reasons but may not be invested due 
to financial criteria.  
 
From the aspect of financial criteria investors who prefer CSR activities may reduce uncertain risk because of low 
information asymmetry as they invest to firms with higher CSR activities. Thus, managers can reduce the cost of 
equity through CSR activities by satisfying stakeholders who want to reduce information asymmetry, and strategically 
accomplish the improvement of firm values and higher financial achievement (Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok & Mishra, 
2010). 
 
Tax investigation is one of firm’s uncertain risks. Firms are levied huge penalties and additional taxes, and experience 
a decrease in work efficiency and legal trouble during the period of tax investigation. Firms with higher CSR activities, 
which reduce costs of equity by decreasing uncertain risks have higher additional opportunity costs on tax 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2017 Volume 33, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1061 The Clute Institute 
investigation than firms with lower CSR activities. Therefore, firms with higher CSR activities are more likely to be 
careful on tax investigation.  
 
Manzon and Plesko (2002) argues that, the probability of tax investigation increases in the BTD. Mills and Sansings 
(2000) also show that collected additional taxes are larger as the BTD are bigger. Moreover, Plesko (2004) argues that 
the book-tax income spread provides tax authorities the information on adaptation to tax payment and investors better 
understanding on the quality of the book-tax spread, and thus tax authorities and investors can make effective decision-
making through the book-tax income spread and especially obtain the information on tax avoidance.   
 
All of these arguments imply that firms with higher CSR activities, wh+ich have greater uncertain risks are less likely 
to avoid taxes than firms with lower CSR activities. It provides us empirically testable hypothesis, Hypothesis 1.  
 
H1: Corporate social responsibility activities are negatively related to tax avoidance. 
 
Social responsibility scores of public Korean firms on Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) in seven major categories: 
financial prudence, fairness and transparency, social services, consumer protection, protection of environments, 
satisfaction of employees, contributions to economic development for each firm-year. 
 
I also test how each individual seven factors of corporate social activities scores provided by KEJI Index dataset is 
associated with CSR activities. It provides seven following testable hypothesis.  
 
H1(a): Financial prudence is negatively related to tax avoidance. 
H1(b): Fairness and transparency are negatively related to tax avoidance. 
H1(c): Social services are negatively related to tax avoidance. 
H1(d): Consumer protection is negatively related to tax avoidance. 
H1(e): Protection of environments is negatively related to tax avoidance. 
H1(f): Satisfaction of employees is negatively related to tax avoidance. 
H1(g): Contributions to economic development are negatively related to tax avoidance. 
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DESCRIBES THE DATA 
 
4.1 Hypothesis Model  
 
As a try to examine whether the firm’s CSR activities affect tax avoidance, I estimate regression model below: 
 𝑇𝑆#$ = 𝑎' + 𝑎)𝐶𝑆𝑅_𝐴#$ + 𝑎.𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸#$ + 𝑎2𝐿𝐸𝑉#$ + 𝑎5𝑅𝑂𝐴#$ + 𝑎7𝑂𝐶𝐹#$ + 𝑎9𝐹𝑂𝑅#$ + 𝑎:𝑂𝑊𝑁#$ +𝑎=𝑀𝑇𝐵#$ + 𝑎@𝐵𝐼𝐺4#$ + 𝑎)'𝑅&𝐷#$ + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀#$ (1) 
 
where TS is a variable for BTD of each firm for each year. I use three different measures for this variable: residual 
BTD following Desai and Dharmapala (2006) (TS1), included year residual BTD following Koh (2007) (TS2), and 
total BTD. CSR_A is number of KEJI Index (Total CSR scores), a proxy for firm’s CSR activities. KEJI has announced 
the index for the manufacturing corporates listed in the KSE. It is a score grounded on the evaluation of a corporate’s 
performance activities using seven major categories with different weights: financial prudence, fairness and 
transparency, social services, consumer protection, protection of environments, satisfaction of employees, and 
contributions to economic development. SIZE is total assets, and enters as logarithm. LEV is the ratio of total liabilities 
to total assets. ROA is the return to assets. OCF is operating cash flow to assets. FOR is ration to total stock and OWN 
is ration to majority stock to total stock. MTB is market value to book value. Big4 is a dummy variable and it is 1 if a 
sample is a big 4 accounting firm, 0 otherwise. R&D is natural log of total R&D costs. Year Dummy and IndDummy 
are dummies for calendar year and K-SIC codes respectively.  
 
Several studies investigate the relation between firm’s characteristics and tax avoidance using a number of the proxies 
such as GAAP ETR, tax shelter and the BTDs (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). I use the BTDs because BTDs provide 
information to the market (Hanlon, 2005). I also estimate equation (1) for each combination of three different BTDs 
and each CSR activities.  
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The main focus of this study is the coefficient on CSR activities (𝑎)). I expect a negative coefficient on the CSR 
activities variable when BTDs (residual, year residual book- and total) are used as measures of tax avoidance as 
mentioned in section 3. 
 
Also, I control for other factors harmonized with tax avoidance measures to investigate whether the CSR activities 
contribute to corporates’ overall level of tax avoidance. Some study argues that economies of scale and firm 
complexity are harmonized with additional tax planning opportunities (e.g., Mills 1998; Koh 2007). Accordingly, I 
control for firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), firm profitability (ROA), operating cash flow (OCF) and growth 
opportunities (MTB). In addition, I control for the big 4 accounting firms (BIG4), and Research & Development (R&D) 
costs.  
 
Besides controlling for known determinants of tax avoidance, I also include firms’ levels of ownership (OWN) and 
foreign ownership (FOR). While the tax plan can have important implications for the development of corporate 
governance can have an important effect on tax avoidance (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Koh, 2007) 
 
I also test hypothesis 1 (a)-(g) using each individual seven index of corporate social activities provided by KEJI index 
to investigate the connection between corporate social activities and tax avoidance by equation (2). 
 𝑇𝑆#$ = 𝑎' + 𝑎)𝐶𝑆𝑅1#$ + 𝑎.𝐶𝑆𝑅2#$ + 𝑎2𝐶𝑆𝑅3#$ + 𝑎5𝐶𝑆𝑅4#$ + 𝑎7𝐶𝑆𝑅5#$ + 𝑎9𝐶𝑆𝑅6#$ + 𝑎:𝐶𝑆𝑅7#$ +𝑎=𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸#$ + 𝑎@𝐿𝐸𝑉#$ + 𝑎)'𝑅𝑂𝐴#$ + 𝑎))𝑂𝐶𝐹#$ + 𝑎).𝐹𝑂𝑅#$ + 𝑎)2𝑂𝑊𝑁#$ + 𝑎)5𝑀𝑇𝐵#$ + 𝑎)7𝐵𝐼𝐺4#$ +𝑎)9𝑅&𝐷#$ + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀#$ (2) 
 
where CSR1it is financial prudence, CSR2it is fairness and transparency, CSR3it is social services, CSR4it is consumer 
protection, CSR5it is protection of environments, CSR6it is satisfaction of employees, and CSR7it is contributions to 
economic development of each sample for each year. 
 
4.2. Sample Selection 
 
This search for sample firms begins with firms that are included in KEJI 200 for the year 2004 through year 2009. In 
the step 2 I compute all variables used for the multivariate analyses. I have 1,800 observations to be merged with 
sample from step 1 after removing observations with missing values. The step 3 after requiring the necessary financial 
data disclosure on Kis-value as well as a matrix of control variables, also from Kis-value, reduces the sample size to 
1,147 firms-years available for regression.  
 
5. RESULT 
 
5.1 Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the tax avoidance, CSR variables and control variables. In terms of TS1, the 
mean (median) is 0.009 (0.005). I also find that the mean (median) for TS2 and TS3 are both 0.009(0.004). Given that 
both Tax avoidance measure have the same numerator. For CSR_A I observe that the mean (median) is 3.851 (3.860). 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of each individual seven index CSR.  CSR1 has a mean (median) of 
2.719(2.733), CSR2 has a mean (median) of 2.130 (2.733), CSR3 has a mean (median) of 1.368 (1.329), CSR4 has a 
mean (median) of 1.197 (1.227), CSR5 has a mean (median) of 1.774 (1.740), CSR6 has a mean (median) 1.774 
(1.722) and CSR7 has a mean (median) of 1.588 (1.598).  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std Dev Min 1st Median 3rd Max 
TS1 .009 .042 -.237 -.007 .005 .021 .306 
TS2 .009 .042 -.239 -.006 .004 .021 .315 
TS3 .009 .042 -.240 -.006 .004 .020 .314 
CSR_A 3.860 .051 3.775 3.821 3.851 3.892 4.046 
CSR1 2.719 .095 2.372 2.660 2.733 2.789 2.913 
CSR2 2.130 .099 1.696 2.048 2.158 2.214 2.327 
CSR3 1.329 .301 .560 1.121 1.368 1.565 2.349 
CSR4 1.197 .119 .811 1.100 1.227 1.247 1.589 
CSR5 1.774 .154 1.470 1.658 1.740 1.887 2.140 
CSR6 1.706 .224 .971 1.559 1.722 1.875 2.163 
CSR7 1.588 .167 1.049 1.472 1.598 1.712 2.066 
SIZE 26.850 1.545 22.591 25.728 26.512 27.683 32.086 
LEV -1.057 .530 -4.072 -1.389 -.956 -.651 .167 
ROA .062 .050 -.326 .032 .056 .088 .359 
OCF .077 .078 -.194 .033 .076 .117 .539 
FOR 16.289 17.539 .000 1.910 10.140 25.953 92.970 
OWN 25.228 14.097 .000 14.425 22.310 33.385 81.400 
MTB .684 .581 .000 .310 .529 .868 6.945 
Here:       TS1:  Residual book-tax differences (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006) 
TS2:  Included year residual book-tax differences (Koh, 2007)   
TS3:  Total book-tax differences (BTD). 
CSR_Act:  Number of KEJI Index (Total CSR scores) 
CSR1:  Number of Financial prudence 
CSR2:  Number of Fairness and transparency 
CSR3:  Number of Social services 
CSR4:  Number of Consumer protection 
CSR5:  Number of Protection of environments 
CSR6:  Number of Satisfaction of employees 
CSR7:  Number of Contributions to economic development 
SIZE:  Natural log of total assets  
LEV:  Total long-term debt / ATt-1 
 
 
Table 2 presents correlations between measures of research regression model. Moreover, I also calculate variance in 
inflation factors (VIFs) when estimating research regression model 1 and model 2to test for signs of multi-collinearity 
among the explanatory variabels. This result confirm that no VIFs exceed twenty for any of explanatory variables, so 
multi-collinearity is not problematic in research regression model 1 and model 2.  
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Table 2. Pearson Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. TS1 1 .993** .993** .007 .058* .069* -.036 .098** .091** -.182** 
2. TS2  1 1.000** .006 .057 .068* -.042 .098** .089** -.174** 
3. TS3   1 .003 .053 .067* -.043 .099** .088** -.172** 
4. CSR_A    1 .449** .250** .393** .134** .333** .320** 
5. CSR1     1 -.070* -.134** -.002 -.087** -.045 
6. CSR2      1 .000 .045 -.003 -.090** 
7. CSR3       1 -.096** .014 -.023 
8. CSR4        1 .259** -.188** 
9. CSR5         1 -.199** 
10. CSR6          1 
 
(Table 2 continued) 
 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1. TS1 .038 .083** -.075* .397** .201** -.028 -.011 .046 .070* -.048 
2. TS2 .039 .075* -.073* .404** .207** -.031 -.011 .046 .067* -.047 
3. TS3 .038 .072* -.074* .409** .187** -.032 -.011 .044 .065* -.047 
4.CSR_A .444** .347** -.065* .235** .252** .249** -.059* .201** .336** .037 
5.CSR1 .017 .090** -.269** .217** .247** .210** -.061* .134** .259** -.023 
6.CSR2 -.018 .077** .037 .043 .069* -.026 .075* .074* .020 .014 
7.CSR3 .074* .151** .027 .066* .057 .018 .035 .026 .016 .035 
8.CSR4 .001 .145** .019 -.037 -.046 .012 -.051 .080** -.055 -.012 
9.CSR5 .183** .445** .079** -.006 .035 .194** -.055 .082** -.019 -.032 
10.CSR6 -.011 -.157** .116** -.055 -.079** -.001 -.011 -.003 .128** .033 
11.CSR7 1 .226** -.070* .297** .248** .168** -.075* .125** .329** .086** 
12.SIZE  1 .314** .069* .135** .424** -.104** .304** .130** -.036 
13.LEV   1 -.248** -.142** -.035 -.018 .108** -.198** .012 
14.ROA    1 .420** .210** .081** .079** .377** -.040 
15.OCF     1 .143** .046 .113** .311** -.019 
16.FOR      1 .020 .199** .298** .005 
17.OWN       1 .066* -.007 .018 
18.BIG4        1 .129** -.073* 
19.MTB         1 -.013 
20.R&D          1 
1) This table presents the Pearson Correlations among main variables  
2) *, ** represent 5% and 1% level significantly respectively 
 
 
5.2 Regression Results 
 
To examine the tax avoidance of CSR, I regress the tax avoidance on various CSR proxies and control variables using 
multivariate regression. Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 reports the regression results for the research model 1 and model 
2. Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 show that the regression coefficient for CSR_A is negative and significantly associated 
with tax avoidance (P<0.01), support for hypothesis 1. Accordingly, CSR activities are negatively related to tax 
avoidance. 
 
Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 also show relate individual seven CSR components and tax avoidance. In this table, 
CRS3 (social services), CSR6 (satisfaction of employees) and CSR7 (contributions to economic development) 
activities are significantly negatively related to tax avoidance. This result support hypothesis 1, too. 
 
The other hand, the regression for CSR1 (financial prudence), CSR2 (fairness and transparency) and CSR4 (consumer 
protection) are not significantly related to tax avoidance. These finding suggest that CSR activities components CSR1 
(financial prudence), CSR2 (fairness and transparency) and CSR4 (consumer protection) do not affect tax avoidance. 
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One puzzling regression result is the coefficient on CSR5 (protection of environments), which loads significantly in a 
positive direction. It is only coefficient that is statistically significant in a positive direction. This suggests that CSR5 
(protection of environments) is associated with tax avoidance.  
 
To summarize, three main result emerge from the analysis in Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5. First, CSR activity is 
associated tax avoidance. Second, the only CSR components that negatively affect tax avoidance are CSR3 (social 
services), CSR6 (satisfaction of employees) and 7(contributions to economic development). Third CSR5 (protection 
of environments) have positively significantly tax avoidance.  
 
 
Table 3. Result of Hypothesis 1 (by using Desai & Dharmapala (2006)’ measure) 
Variable TS1(residual book-tax differences (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006) Coeff. t-stat. VIF Coeff. t-stat. VIF 
Intercept 0.178 1.861*  -0.005 0.055  
CSR_A -0.069 -2.639*** 1.473    
CSR1    -0.009 -0.647 1.368 
CSR2    0.006 0.527 1.066 
CSR3    -0.006 -1.519 1.193 
CSR4    0.008 0.807 1.193 
CSR5    0.015 1.665* 1.741 
CSR6    -0.012 -2.104** 1.416 
CSR7    -0.039 -4.691*** 1.674 
SIZE 0.003 3.317*** 1.803 0.002 2.150** 2.343 
LEV -0.002 -0.797 1.335 -0.001 -0.251 1.470 
ROA 0.367 14.235*** 1.410 0.387 14.817*** 1.475 
OCF 0.023 1.451 1.328 0.025 1.511 1.372 
FOR -0.033 -4.382*** 1.434 -0.033 -4.458*** 1.460 
OWN -0.016 -1.950* 1.065 -0.017 -2.181** 1.090 
MTB -0.003 -1.122 1.499 0.000 0.103 1.617 
BIG4 0.002 0.584 1.228 0.002 0.770 1.244 
R&D -0.001 -0.439 1.036 0.001 0.280 1.060 
Year_D Yes 
Industry_D Yes 
Adj. R2 0.226 0.243 
F-value 19.650 16.345 
1) *, **, *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% level significantly respectively 
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Table 4. Result of Hypothesis 1 (by using Koh (2007)’ measure) 
Variable TS2 (included year residual book-tax differences (Ko, 2007) Coeff. t-stat. VIF Coeff. t-stat. VIF 
Intercept 0.189 1.978*  0.003 0.049  
CSR_A -0.070 -2.656*** 1.473    
CSR1    -0.009 -0.655 1.368 
CSR2    0.006 0.527 1.066 
CSR3    -0.007 -1.681* 1.193 
CSR4    0.009 0.881 1.193 
CSR5    0.016 1.693* 1.741 
CSR6    -0.011 -1.981** 1.416 
CSR7    -0.040 -4.794*** 1.674 
SIZE 0.003 2.979*** 1.803 0.002 1.893* 2.343 
LEV -0.001 -0.564 1.335 0.000 -0.041 1.470 
ROA 0.375 14.534 1.410 0.396 15.158*** 1.475 
OCF 0.027 1.642 1.328 0.028 1.726* 1.372 
FOR -0.032 -4.355*** 1.434 -0.033 -4.443*** 1.460 
OWN -0.016 -2.012* 1.065 -0.018 -2.238 1.090 
MTB -0.003 -1.216 1.499 0.000 0.006 1.617 
BIG4 0.002 0.671 1.228 0.002 0.851 1.244 
R&D -0.001 -0.435 1.036 0.001 0.301 1.060 
Year_D Yes 
Industry_D Yes 
Adj. R2 0.232 0.250 
F-value 20.290 16.910 
1) *, **, *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% level significantly respectively 
 
 
Table 5. Result of Hypothesis 1 (by using BTD) 
Variable TS3 (total book-tax differences)  Coeff. t-stat. VIF Coeff. t-stat. VIF 
Intercept 0.190 1.989*  0.004 0.067  
CSR_A -0.070 -2.666*** 1.473    
CSR1    -0.009 -0.674 1.368 
CSR2    0.006 0.512 1.066 
CSR3    -0.007 -1.690* 1.193 
CSR4    0.009 0.884 1.193 
CSR5    0.016 1.703* 1.741 
CSR6    -0.011 -1.977** 1.416 
CSR7    -0.040 -4.785*** 1.674 
SIZE 0.003 2.979*** 1.803 0.002 1.888* 2.343 
LEV -0.001 -0.570 1.335 0.000 -0.051 1.470 
ROA 0.389 15.090*** 1.410 0.410 15.706** 1.475 
OCF 0.012 0.731 1.328 0.013 0.822 1.372 
FOR -0.032 -4.363*** 1.434 -0.033 -4.451*** 1.460 
OWN -0.016 -2.009** 1.065 -0.018 -2.234*** 1.090 
MTB -0.003 -1.206 1.499 0.000 0.012 1.617 
BIG4 0.002 0.661 1.228 0.002 0.841 1.244 
R&D -0.001 -0.437 1.036 0.001 0.298 1.060 
Year_D Yes 
Industry_D Yes 
Adj. R2 0.235 0.252 
F-value 20.554 17.107 
1) *, **, *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% level significantly respectively 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines whether CSR activity affects tax avoidance. I contend that CSR activities are negatively related 
to tax avoidance. Using a sample of 1,477 Korean firms-year observations from 2004 to 2009 and controlling for other 
firm-specific determinants as well as industry and year fixed effects, I find that firms with CSR activity significantly 
associated with lower tax avoidance. The empirical results are consistent with hypothesis. Moreover, I find that not 
all individual seven CSR components are related to tax avoidance. In particular, while CRS activities for social 
services, satisfaction of employees and contributions to economic development contribute to lowering tax avoidance, 
CSR activities for financial prudence, fairness and transparency and consumer protection do not. This study 
contributes to examine how CSR affects managers’ decision-making on taxes.  
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APPENDIX 
 
KEJI Index (disclosure items) 
	
	
Evaluation Criteria Evaluation Index Score 
Financial prudence 
(CSR1) 
Prudence of organization of shareholders 12 
Prudence of Investment  3 
Prudence of financing 10 
Tax evasion - 
Fairness and transparency 
(CSR2) 
Fairness 5 
Transparency 8 
Cooperative relation 2 
Holding stakes of press and financial institutions  - 
Social services 
(CSR3) 
Protection of the neglected 6 
Contribution to society 4 
Consumer protection 
(CSR4) 
Consumer right protection 5 
Product quality 3 
Advertisement 2 
Protection of environments 
(CSR5) 
Effort to environmental improvement 7 
 Being environmental-friendly 3 
Violation and pollution records 5 
Satisfaction of employees 
(CSR6) 
Health care and Security in Work places  2 
Investment on human capital 4 
Wages and employment welfare  4 
Labor relations 2 
Sex discrimination 3 
Cooperation of labor and managers - 
Contributions to economic 
development 
(CSR7) 
Research and development (R&D) 3 
Management performance and contributions to economic development  7 
Total 
(KEJI)  100 
